INTRODUCTION Nation-states are under attack by non-state actors; whether non-state actors present an existential threat to nation-states is debatable, probably unlikely. Nevertheless, the threat to innocent human life that terrorism poses must not be underestimated. Because terrorist organizations have defined the innocent civilian population as legitimate targets, the state must develop and implement aggressive counterterrorism measures. That, in a nutshell, is the state of the world post-9/11. While reasonable minds may disagree as to the degree of threat that terrorism poses, there is httle (never say never) disagreement that terrorism poses a (not necessarily the) threat to the nation-state.
This reality has forced decision-makers to address terrorism and terrorists literally "on the fly." In retrospect, Tuesday morning September 11, 2001 , not only caught world leaders by surprise, but most were also unprepared and untrained to 315 respond in a sophisticated and strategic manner. In the United States, as thoroughly documented elsewhere, the lack of preparation directly contributed to significant violations of human rights including torture, rendition, indeflnite detention, and unauthorized wiretapping.' The Executive Branch in the United States^ chose the path of granting itself unprecedented powers, with Congress and the Supreme Court largely acquiescing. While historians will judge whether this combination made America safer, the wise words of Benjamin Franklin-"Those who would give up essential Liberty, to purchase a little temporary Safety deserve neither Liberty nor Safety"^-were largely ignored in the aftermath of 9/11.
The ten-year anniversary of 9/11 serves as a useful benchmark for looking back to gauge what measures have been implemented, to what degrees of effectiveness, and at what cost. The anniversary additionally serves as a useful benchmark for looking forward and addressing how to develop, articulate, and implement changes to existing counterterrorism strategy. This Article does not offer a broad retrospective of post-9/11 decisions; rather, this Article focuses on the definition of "legitimate target."
Discussion regarding the Manual on International Law Applicable to Air and Missile Warfare (AMW Manual)" is particularly relevant to the legitimate target discussion. After all, air and missile warfare is related directly to the legitimate target dilemma. Any analysis of air and missile warfare must include discussion regarding deflning a legitimate target and then, subsequently, determining when the individual defined as a legitimate target is, indeed, a legitimate target. In that context, the link between the definition of a legitimate target and the AMW Manual is inexorable.
Two central questions with respect to operational counterterrorism are who can be targeted and when can the identified legitimate target be legitimately targeted. Those two questions go to the heart of both self-defense and the use of power. In a counterterrorism regime subject to the rule of law, use of power is neither unlimited nor unrestrained. When regimes subject neither to external nor internal restraints may engage in maximum use of force, needless to say, operational results will be uncertain.
A comparative survey of operational counterterrorism is telling, for it highlights how distinct approaches color the legitimate target discussion. The Russian experience in Chechnya presents a particularly stark example of maximum force with questionable results.' Conversely, Spain's experience in the aftermath of the Madrid With the primary focus on who is a legitimate target and when the target is legitimate, this Article is organized as follows: Section I offers a "word of caution" in an age of uncertainty; Section II discusses operational counterterrorism; Section III offers a survey of how the term legitimate target has been defined historically and applied in the battlefield; Section IV focuses on the non-state actor and international law; Section V discusses defining the legitimate target; Section VI focuses on the practical apphcation of the legitimate target definition from the commander's perspective; and the conclusion proposes a road map for both the definition of legitimate target and its application.
I. A WORD OF CAUTION: DECISION MAKING IN THE AGE OF UNCERTAINTY
It is important to note that the killing of Osama Bin Laden is, arguably, a "once in a lifetime" event representing a perfect confluence of intelligence gathering, intelligence analysis, and extraordinary operational capability. When the Navy SEALS stood opposite Bin Laden there was, according to reports, no doubt that this was, indeed. Bin Laden.'" The legitimate target dilemmas that are the focus of this Article are, largely, not relevant either to the planning or implententation of the Bin Laden operation because the "operation" was dilemma-free. That is distinct from the norm in operational counterterrorism decision making, which is largely characterized by extraordinary uncertainty. The Bin Laden operation was clear-cut; most counterterrorism operations are far more gray than black and white. This reahty is essential to the legitimate target discussion.
Once President Obama (and before him President Bush) authorized the operation, there was an extraordinary (actually, unprecedented) focus on one individual with practically unlimited resources available.'' The efforts of all involved in the Bin Laden killing are, undoubtedly, exemplary and represent professionahsm at the highest levels; however, the overwhelming majority of special operations present operational dilemmas not confronted by those involved in this very unique, specific act of counterterrorism. The legitimate target questions addressed in this Arficle were, largely, not relevant to the Bin Laden operation; to extrapolate from the latter to create a legitimate target model would be disingenuous. It would also create a false paradigm, as the overwhelming majority of counterterrorism operations lack the intelligence and absolute operafional clarity that characterized the Bin Laden "hit." detention centers around the world, including Abu Ghraib and Bagram" and that, in 2005, Abu Ghraib held "approximately 10,000 long-term detainees").
14. While Tennyson suggests a lamb-to-the-slaughter type cruelty awaiting the grunt who knows both his enemy and his fate, operational counterterrorism represents significantly different complexities. The uncertainty at the heart of these complexities is a direct result of the legitimate target question. In traditional combat, soldiers could easily identify their foe; in operational counterterrorism, the foe is extraordinarily difficult to identify, for his attire resembles that of the general population with whom he easily mingles and to whom he quickly retreats after committing an act of terrorism.^" The certainty of enemy identification that was the essence of traditional combat has been replaced by extraordinary uncertainty in state/non-state conflicts.
II.
OPERATIONAL COUNTERTERRORISM Failure to create a framework for the operational decision-maker^' is arguably convenient for politicians and the public. However, in a rule of law paradigm this 16 . See generally Amos N. Guiora, Command Influence: The Confluence Between Law and Command (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
17. In that vein, when my son was inducted into the IDF I wished for him four things: 1) commanders who understand command; 2) fellow soldiers who will have "each other's back" (akin to "Band of Brothers"); 3) that he will know how to take care of himself; and 4) that he will never lose his moral compass. On the day he was inducted, as my wife and children parted from him he held up four fingers. Never have I, as a parent, been prouder.
18. In a remarkably candid observation, an IDF one-star general commented to me in 1996 that were he then a company commander he would resign his position given the inherent uncertainty in articulating to soldiers under his command both who presents a clear and present danger and what are clear rules of engagement. , THE POETICAL WORKS OF ALFRED, LORD TENNYSON, POET   LAUREATE 170 (1908). 20. GUIORA, GLOBAL PERSPECTIVES, supra note 5, at 22.
ALFRED, LORD TENNYSON
21. For purposes of this Article, the phrase 'operational decision-maker' refers to an "on the ground" commander.
disturbing failure places the commander at a significant disadvantage; he is expected to act in accordance with international law and the laws of war, while the non-state actor is beholden neither to law nor morahty. However, even though the framework has not been sufficiently constructed, the nation-state remains distinct from the nonstate actor. Simply stated, the nation-state's operational counterterrorism measures should be subject to three hmits: 1) domestic law, 2) international law, and 3) morality. The first and third are largely self-imposed and self-regulated; the second is a reflection of international treaties, agreements, rules, and principles. Ostensibly, domestic law must comply with international law, but what if the current state of international law is insufficient to meet the needs of operational decision-makers distinct from the traditional warfare Tennyson so compellingly addressed?
International law, in its current articulation, is inadequate regarding the state/non-state conflict; after all, the laws of armed conflict were codified in an era where warfare was conducted between nation-states with rules clearly articulated and understood, though tragically not always respected.^^ Needless to say, today's conflict is fundamentally different. Therefore, to address the two-fold question of who a legitimate target is and when the target is legitimate requires deflning the conflict; that task is far easier said than done.
What Israel has defined as "armed conflict short of war,"" others have termed in a similarly vague, uncertain manner reflecting the inherent linguistic and structural ambiguity of a conflict between a state and a non-state actor.^" A non-state actor is, undoubtedly, distinct from the nation-state; the latter, after all,, is a deflnable and distinguishable entity in accordance with the terms of the Peace of Westphalia.^' The post-9/11 geo-strategic map, however, is rife with non-state actors that both defy deflnition and lack firm borders, both of which are the essence of ;he nation-state.
In the face of this troubling and complicated uncertainty, democratic regimes must develop effective counterterrorism measures that are bout legal and moral. While the history of warfare is replete with violations of the laws of war, those laws were known to combatants and commanders alike who willfully violated them. In the present state/non-state actor paradigm the rules are known and largely respected by one side and largely ignored by the other side who consistently claims that nationstate created rules of war do not apply to them.^' In essence, non-state actors claim unilateral immunity from international law obligations while crying "foul" when the nation-state engages in aggressive operational counterterrorism.
That, however, does not release the state from honoring ils international law commitments; after all, international law clearly articulates that violations by one party do not justify violations by another party." The state, then, is limited to how it may prevent or react to terrorism. While the pubhc may clamor-arguably encouraged by the media-for aggressive measures, the reahty of operational counterterrorism is that limits, more often than not, guide decision-makers. While those limits are largely self-imposed, they are a reahty; how limits are determined and applied in a time-sensitive environment is at the core of lawful counterterrorism. While recommending forceful action is second nature to pundits and politicians alike, counterterrorism decision-makers confront a largely unseen enemy who benefits from dark shadows and back alleys.
The concept of proportionality is often raised to condemn state actors for engaging in conduct presumed to violate international law.^' While state actions often result in significant damage, the proportionality concept is largely misapplied in state/non-state actor conflicts. The state has resources and military material far exceeding those of the non-state actor; therefore, proportionality is an intellectual and semantic misnomer. There is no-and there cannot be-proportionality between the conduct of the two sides. The two are inherently dissimilar; to equate them in terms of proportionality is disingenuous.
The more appropriate inquiry is to determine whether operational counterterrorism measures applied by the state are proportionate to the threat posed by the non-state actor.^' In conducting this inquiry, the inherent disproportionality regarding means available is a given; the question-at the heart of lawful counterterrorism-is whether the means used reflect an appropriately measured response to the threat posed. Targeted killing^" and drone attacks'' are, in many ways, at the heart of this question; in both cases, the state's quantitative advantageelaborate and expensive intelligence-gathering infrastructure, sophisticated weapons systems,'^ and significant resources-distinguish the state from the non-state actor. That is not to suggest that non-state actors do not have resources and weapons capable of inflicting signiflcant harm on innocent civilians whom they target. It is important to recall that the most famous terror attack of the past decade was successfully completed with the use of inexpensive box cutters. That is not, however, intended to minimize the threats posed by terrorist organizations whose weapons of choice include suicide and roadside bombings,'^ firing thousands of missiles at innocent civilians,'" and reported efforts to develop nonconventional weapons.^'
Protecting the civilian population does not justify random counterterrorism measures devoid of legal criteria and operational guidelines. The threat posed by terrorism-ranging from minor to major-does not create a paradigm whereby the state can ignore principles such as proportionality and limits on self-defense. The "black flag" standard articulated by Judge Halevy'* has direct implications on how the state implements both targeted killing and drone attacks." That is, while both Israel and the United States have determined that aggressive self-defense is necessary and justified in protecting innocent civilians, lawful counterterrorism must be conducted morally and in accordance with existing international and domestic law obligations.
Otherwise, ensuring implementation of restrained measures emphasizing identification of specific targets is all but a tragic non-starter. 36. On the eve of the 1956 Sinai Campaign, cui-few was imposed on villages whose residents were Israeli Arabs. When Border PoUce soldiers assigned to enforce the curfew asked for instructions regarding the fate of the field hands who, when they were to return to the village (Kfar Kassem), did not know of the curfew, their commander responded "God have mercy on them." That response led to the killing of forty-seven IsraeH Arabs. In a subsequent trial. Judge Benjamin Halevy held that manifestly illegal orders-that fly like a "black flag" -must be disobeyed. Leslie C. The complexity of identifying the legifimate target in the present conflictwhich I agree should be deemed an "armed conflict short of war"-poses extraordinary challenges. This need is particularly acute as international law does not provide clear criteria or criteria extending beyond the four "holy grails" of international law: the principles of mihtary necessity, collateral damage, proportionality, and alternatives.^* In the legitimate target discussion, it is increasingly questionable whether those four principles provide sufficient direction to commanders making "real time" decisions.
Protecting a civilian population does not justify non-target-specific counterterrorism; the measure must be based on legal, moral, and operational criteria and guidelines. This is predicated on aggressive self-defense with legitimate operational requirements; however, the road map international law provides is unclear, particularly because the conflict itself is inherently nebulous. The "on the ground" commander is placed in the difficult position of operating in a "gray" zone largely marked by amorphousness and vagueness.'' Simply put, when an "open fire" order may be given is, in many circumstances, unclear; this is particularly the case when ambiguity surrounds the question of whether an identified target individual poses a sufficient enough threat regarding either the future or present.
III. TARGETING CRITERIA FROM JUST WAR THEORY TO ASYMMETRIC WARFARE
The codified laws of armed conflict, as they exist today, are insufficient to deal with the threats posed by modern terrorist organizations. International law is behind the curve regarding the national security dilemmas nation-states currently confront. This deficiency is particularly apparent when it comes to defining who is a legitimate target and when. In order to appreciate the inadequacies of current operational paradigms, examining the evolution of targeting criteria throughout history is enhghtening.""
In the fifth century, St. Augustine helped articulate a theory that granted moral legitimacy to warfare and became the foundation for modern military philosophy."' The Just War Doctrine, expanded and refined by subsequent scholars, including St. Thomas Aquinas, acknowledged that resorting to war may sometimes be necessary to obtain justice and to protect peace.'^ Inherent in this theory are criteria and conditions regarding the legitimate use of force. These conditions include the exercise of discrimination and proportionality and the prohibition against targeting non-combatants."T he medieval code of chivalry, which revolved around the concept of knighthood, added another branch to the evolutionary tree of western warfare."* Chivalry existed as a code of conduct for knights and placed an emphasis on honor, which became a dominant theme regarding how knights could behave on and off the battlefield."" It was honorable and appropriate to target opposing knights on the batflefleld, but it was against the code of chivalry to either attack another knight's horse or the weak and defenseless."' According to Professor Michael Walzer, "some sense of military honor is still the creed of the professional soldier, the sociological if not the lüneal descendent of the feudal knight.""' The U.S. Army speciflcally instructs its soldiers that the law of war requires them to "conduct hostilities with regard for the principles of humanity and chivalry.""* The Treaty of Westphalia (1648) established the modern framework for warfare-a framework inextricably linked to the concept of the modern nationstate."' Perhaps the most important development that came from this time period, as it relates to current targeting issues, was the evolution of war into a public, statesponsored enterprise.'" Uniforms became standardized and soldiers became increasingly professionally trained;" the transition of war into a public enterprise increased transparency regarding norms and expectations of behavior and conduct."
The centuries that followed saw the codification of the modern rules of warfare. Public war is a state of armed hostihty between sovereign nations or governments. It is a law and requisite of civilized existence that men live in political, continuous societies, forming organized units, called states or nations, whose constituents bear, enjoy, and suffer, advance and retrograde together, in peace and in war.'* The Lieber Code specifically draws a distinction among enemies between combatants and non-combatants'' and articulates a class of protected persons and property."* Though never used expressly as a code of conduct by other states, the Lieber Code informs many international treaties and conventions of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries."
The Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907 established important restrictions regarding battlefield conduct that are still in effect today.'* The Hague Conventions are generally referred to as the "means and methods" of warfare." To be defined as a combatant-or "belligerent," in Hague parlance-a soldier, militia member, or volunteer must meet four conditions: (1) operate under the command of a superior officer, (2) wear a fixed, distinctive emblem that is recognizable at a distance, (3) carry arms openly, and (4) behave in accordance with the laws and customs of war.™ The Hague rules prohibit attacking undefended towns, villages, habitations, or buildings and also prohibit killing or wounding "treacherously individuals belonging to the hostile nation or army."*'
In the wake of World War II, the Geneva Conventions further codified and solidified the rules of modern warfare. ' conflict into two categories: armed conflict between two or more states (also known as an international armed conflict or IAC)'^ and armed conflict not of an international nature occurring within the territory of a state (also known as a noninternational armed conflict or NIAC.)" According to the Geneva Conventions, "Persons taking no active part in the hostilities, including members of armed forces who have laid down their arms and those placed hors de combat by sickness, wounds, detention, or any other cause, shall in all circumstances be treated humanely "'T hus, a soldier who has put down his or her weapon, has stepped out of uniform, and has returned to civilian life can no longer be considered a legitimate target;** conversely, a soldier during wartime-who is in uniform and carrying arms-may be considered a legitimate target.*'
In 1956, the U.S. Department of the Army published its Pield Manual 27-10 (FM 27-10).** The Army subsequenfly updated the manual as the Law of War Handbook in 2005.*' FM 27-10 does not preclude attacks on individual soldiers of the enemy-whether in the "zone of hostilities ... or elsewhere"™-but it does prohibit speciflc targeting of civiHans." According to FM 27-10, both combatants and those objects that make an effective contribution to military action are targetable."
Finally, the Additional Protocols to the Geneva Conventions (1977) introduced the concept of direct participation in hostihties-a new class of combatants (occasionally referred to as those who DPH or are DPH-ingX" Article 13(3) of Additional Protocol II asserts that "[cjivilians shall enjoy the protection afforded by [this portion of the protocol], unless and for such time as they take direct part in hostihties."" Civihans who take direct part in hostihties are not lawful belligerents under the Geneva Conventions, nor are they afforded immunity from attack or the prisoner of war protections laid out in the various international treaties governing armed conflict.
The nature of armed conflict has changed dramatically in the past century, most notably in two ways: (1) weaponry has evolved significantly and (2) the actors are different. The rise of non-state actors, acting outside the purviev of the nation-state, has led to what scholars term "asymmetric warfare."" Those who do not abide by international conventions and treaties, or the general laws of warfare, place the nation-state in an extraordinary quandary regarding the appropriate targeting paradigm. It is to that issue that we now turn our attention.
IV. THE NON-STATE ACTOR AND INTERNATIONAL LAW
When a state is engaged in conflict with a non-state actor, the state isironically and counterintuitively-at a profound disadvantage. Asymmetric warfare-where the state possesses strength and means disproportionate to that of the non-state actor-is an unquestionably apt description of many current conflicts. However, because most states seek to conduct themselves in accordance with international law, the advantage they possess cannot be utilized. Conversely, nonstate actors have chosen to operate free from such limits; they are, therefore, able to maximize the means available to them. The self-imposed limits paradigm, then, is an essential aspect of the legitimate target discussion.
While terrorists target innocent civilians in an effort to advance their respective causes, international law demands that the state distinguish between innocent civilians and combatants; the former are not legitimate targets whereas the latter are. However, from an operational perspective, implementing the distinction between civihan and combatant is enormously complicated, largely because the contemporary "zone of combat" is far different from the battlefield of traditional warfare. In the zone of combat, innocent civihans and combatants are often indistinguishable, whereas on the traditional battlefield, combatants were readily identifiable.
According to the traditional law of armed conflict, in order to be defined as a lawful combatant-and thus a person who may rightfully be identified as a legitimate target on the battlefield-a participant in a conflict must carry his weapon openly, belong to a chain of command, have readily identifiable insignia, and follow the laws of war.'* Because terrorist organizations deliberately fail to distinguish themselves, identifying the legitimate target is exponentially more complicated. In other words, non-state actors consciously place their own civilian population "at risk" by blending in. Additionally, human shielding, a clear violation of international law," is practiced by non-state actors in an effort to minimize the state's abihty to operationally engage legitimate targets.'* That is, terrorists seek to protect themselves by surrounding themselves with innocent civiUans. Colonel Richard Kemp, CBE," describes this practice:
In Gaza, according to residents there, Hamas fighters who previously wore black or khaki uniforms, discarded them when Operation Cast Lead began, to blend in with the crowds and use them as human shields.
We have of course seen all this before, in Lebanon, in Iraq and in Afghanistan.
Today, British soldiers patrolling in Helmand Province will come under sustained rocket, machine-gun and small-arms fire from 76. GC III, supra note 62, art. 4(2). 77. GC IV, supra note 62, art. within a populated village or a network of farming complexes containing local men, women and children.
The British will return fire, with as much caution as possible. Rather than drop a 500 pound bomb onto the enemy from the air, to avoid civihan casualties, they will assault through the village, placing their own lives at greater risk. They might face booby traps or mines as they clear through.
When they get into the village there is no sign of the enemy. Instead, the same people that were shooting at them twenty minutes ago, now unrecognised by them, will be tilling the land, waving, smiling and talking cheerfully to the soldiers.*" There is, then, a significant burden imposed on the state: in determining when to operationally engage an identified legitimate target, the state's working assumption must be that the individual has deliberately surrounded himself with innocent individuals. In the context of operational counterterrorism, then, the state has to determine what costs it is willing to incur with respect to collateral damage. Effecfive and lawful counterterrorism is predicated on successful targeting of a specific, identified individual; killing innocent individuals-in addition to raising significant questions with respect to collateral damage-also has significant "blowback" potential that enlarges the circle of potential terrorists.
However, the state has both the right to engage in preemptive self-defense and the obligation to protect its own innocent civilian population. The operative question is whether the willful endangerment of innocent individuals by non-state actors must, necessarily, deter the state from engaging in operational counterterrorism. That is, identifying the legitimate target and determining when that individual is a legifimate target (in the context of what activities the individual must be involved in to determine his legitimacy) are but two of the three steps in the decision whether to engage. The third step-on the assumption that the first two have been correctly assessed-is no less complicated, as it raises profound moral and legal dilemmas.*'
In turning asymmetric warfare theory on its head, non-state actors, in essence, seek to take advantage of the state's commitment to international law. The introduction of innocent civilians as human shields in the legitimate target decisionmaking process illustrates the difference between traditional warfare and modern conflicts. In the former, soldiers fought soldiers, tanks with soldiers attacked tanks with soldiers, fighter planes flown by highly trained pilots engaged planes flown by highly trained pilots, and fully manned batfle ships engaged fully manned batfle ships. The legitimate target dilemma was less convoluted-until surrender, capture. injury, or death, a soldier was rightfully considered a legitimate target.*^ This type of clarity no longer exists.
Arguably the most complicated dilemma in modern conflict is what degree of involvement is required for an individual to become a legitimate target. However, as Colonel Kemp made clear, targeting an individual as a legitimate target is fundamentally more complicated than mere identification of the individual as a legitimate target.*' The decision by non-state actors to use human shields is, then, an extraordinarily significant "x factor" in the legitimate target discussion. It manifests a fundamental change in how combat is conducted on two distinct levels: it is a major violation of international law, and it represents a willingness to expose an otherwise innocent individual to extraordinary danger.
It is, frankly, counterintuitive to what soldiers are taught. While soldiers are, obviously, trained to kill the identified enemy, the emphasis is on the identified threat and the goal is to minimize potential harm to the innocent population of the other side. Human shielding reflects a policy and philosophy whereby innocent individuals (whom the soldier is taught to avoid) are willfully endangered by their "own side" in the name of the cause. Ironically, then, from the perspective of nonstate actors, individuals defined as innocent civihans by international law are treated as permissible targets.
However, the state must exercise extreme caution in any unilateral broadening of how the term "legitimate target" is defined. The question, as will be discussed below, is whether an individual poses a threat and what the level or degree of that threat is. There is great danger in applying too liberal a deflnition to the term "legitimate target." The ramifications would be inevitable: unwarranted targeting of individuals whose actions do not endanger state security. The results from a legal, moral, and effectiveness analysis would be deeply troubling.
Defining an individual as a legitimate target in accordance with international law requires adopting a strict deflnition of threat; otherwise, individuals only tangentially involved in counterterrorism might be targeted. That said, herein lies the rub: as was made clear in the course of Qperation Cast Lead (QCL), Israel unilaterally expanded the definition of legitimate target to include individuals who, prior to QCL, would not have been defined as legitimate targets.^ The adoption of this expanded model of legitimate target was based on the theory-adopted from the suicide bomber paradigm-that the firing of 6,000 missiles into Israel from 2005 to 82. LAW OF WAR HANDBOOK, supra note 38, at 169-70. In that spirit, when visiting the parents of a soldier under my command who had been injured in a suicide bombing, I sought (unsuccessfully) to explain that from the perspective of terrorists, a soldier-whether armed or not-is a legitimate target. I also sought (again, unsuccessfully) to explain to the parents that a terrorist attack can only be directed against innocent civilians (and not soldiers). As I have repeatedly mentioned to colleagues, this effort on my part (which thoroughly failed) also represents a classic example of the rule that "silence is golden. (stating that Hamas has used women, children, and the elderly as human shields).
84. Guiora, Proportionality "Re-Configured", supra note 29, at 13.
2008 required a sophisticated infrastructure and that individuals involved in its various components were deemed legitimate targets.^ That is, both the severity of their actions and the continuous nature of their involvement justified-from Israel's perspective-defining those involved in distinct aspects of the missile firing infrastructure as legitimate targets.
As discussed below, this unilateral expansiveness implementing a broadened definition of legitimate target implies a signiflcant burden and responsibility for both decision-makers and boots-on-the-ground commanders. Whib, from an operational perspective, the conclusion that those involved in an infrastructure are legitimate targets is understandable, the discussion cannot end there. The legal and moral implications in applying a broadened definition significantly increase the likelihood of harm to otherwise innocent individuals who cannot be classified as legitimate targets, whether the term is broadly or narrowly defined. There is, however, an important caveat to this "word of caution": the increasing sophistication of terrorist networks arguably justifies adopting-with great care -a broadened definition of legitimate target.
V. DEFINING THE LEGITIMATE TARGET
The scenario below is intended both to make the discussion more concrete and to place the reader in the decision-maker's shoes. Furthermore, it is intended to highlight the extraordinary complexity of the decision-making process in determining whether an individual is a legitimate target. To that end, 1 suggest the following definition for a legitimate target in the state/non-state actor conflict: An individual who, according to intelligence information received and analyzed from at least two distinct sources (therefore corroborated), intends in the future to either commit or facilitate an act of terrorism that endangers national security.
In addition to asking whether the individual is or will be involved in an act of significant terrorism, the decision to categorize the target as legitimate requires determining what act the individual must be engaged in when "hit." This is the "when" question. For pre-emptive self-defense to be lawful, involvement-however defined-must be sufficient to define the target as legitimate. The second part of the analysis is no less important than the first. In analyzing the additional but equally important question, decision-makers and commanders must determine whether the target is actively and presently involved in some level of conduct, including "mere" planning. Re-articulated: is the theory of "continuum"'* sufficient without narrowly defining what the individual's actions must be when authorizing his killing?
There is, obviously, a danger in adopting the continuum theory; if applied to its logical end, it suggests that once the intelligence community defines an individual as a legitimate target his actions thereafter are, largely, irrelevant. This, naturally, raises concerns as to whether, once defined as legitimate, an individual's status is subject to review and if the operational opportunity presents itself to engage him as a legitimate target regardless of what he is doing at that specific moment. Conversely, to demand that the state target an individual only when specifically engaged in the act for which he was initially deemed legitimate imposes an unreahstic burden. The 85. Id. at 11-13. 86. The theory of "continuum" consists of viewing legitimacy on a timeline from initial planning to fruition without need for a particular act to occur to justify killing the target defined as legitimate.
test, then, in determining whether an individual is a legitimate target demands assessing the level of his involvement ranging from planning to executing a specific act of terrorism.
In order to ensure that operational counterterrorism be both legal and moral, I propose the following:
(1) A target must have made significant steps directly contributing to a planned act of terrorism.
(2) An individual cannot be a legitimate target unless intelligence indicates involvement in future acts of terrorism.*' (3) Before a hit is authorized, it must be determined that the individual is still involved and has not proactively disassociated from the original plan.
(4) The individual's contribution to the planned attack must extend beyond mere passive support.( 5) Every effort must be made to minimize collateral damage. However, the willful endangerment by the non-state actor of its own civilian population need not be a deterrent from implementing an authorized act of preventive self-defense. The following scenario will help illustrate the need for these criteria: From 1994 to 1997, I served as the Legal Advisor to the Gaza Strip; in that capacity I was involved in targeted killing decisions. As I have argued elsewhere, effective and legal targeted killing must be predicated on a rationally based decisionmaking process that emphasizes criteria and standards." The motivation for such a recommendation is to minimize collateral damage and to enhance operational success by emphasizing person-specific counterterrorism. The process, without doubt, is important for the commander for it minimizes the ability of decision-makers to introduce subjective "distractions" into the equation. While it does not ensure that only legitimate targets will be killed-and that there will be no collateral damage-it enhances the maximization of the former and minimization of the latter.
Essential to the legitimate-target discussion is deflning threats; after all, counterterrorism reflects a concerted effort by the state to mitigate, if not nullify, a presumed threat. To that end, there are four distinct degrees of threats; operational decision-making requires assessing each threat in determining what, if any, counterterrorism measure should be applied. The four degrees of threats are:
(1) Imminent threats: threats that will be acted upon shortly and about which a lot of detail is known (2) Foreseeable threats: threats that will be carried out in the near future (with no speciflcity). These threats are slightly more remote than those that 90 . This scenario appears in Ezzo & Guiora, supra note 39, at 91-92. 91. See Guiora, Criteria-Based Reasoning, supra note 30 (noting that "[c]riteria-based decisionmaking is intended to foster objective decisions").
are imminent. (3) Long-range threats: threats that may reach fruition at an unknown (4) Uncertain threats: threats that invoke general fears of insecurity Nevertheless, for the criteria model to be truly effective, it must answer the two questions that are at the heart of this Article. By example, the Israeli model is threat based; that is, if an individual has been identified by a source as posing a present or future threat, and this individual's actions will endanger state security, then he is a legitimate target for a targeted killing.'" One of the most important questions in putting together an operational "jigsaw puzzle" is whether the received information is actionable; that is, does the information received from the source warrant an operational response?
That question is central to criteria-based decision making or at least to decision making that seeks-in real time-to create objective standards for making decisions based on imperfect information. This effort is essential to counterterrorism measures reflecting enhanced objectivity and minimal subjectivity in the decisionmaking process. To that end, the intelligence and the source who provided the information both must be subject to rigorous analysis. The charts below articulate guidelines for determining whether the intelligence is sufficiently actionable.''
Reliable

Viable
Relevant Corroborated
Past experiences show the source to be a dependable provider of correct information. The test requires discerning whether the information is useful and accurate, and demands analysis by the case officer regarding whether the source has a personal agenda/grudge with respect to the person identified/targeted. Is it possible that an attack could occur in accordance with the source's information? That is, the information provided by the source indicates that it is in the realm of the possible and feasible that a terrorist attack could take place. The information has bearing on upcoming events. Consider both the timeliness of the information and whether it is time sensitive, imposing the need for an immediate counterterrorism measure.
Another source (who meets the reliability test above) confirms the information in whole or part. 92 . For example, a foreseeable threat would be premised on "valid intelligence that indicates that terrorists will shortly begin bringing explosives onto airplanes in liquid substances." AMOS N. GuiORA, 
Source ! ' \ \ \
• What is the source's background and how does that affect the information provided?
• Does the source have a grudge/personal "score" to settle based either on a past personal or family relationship with the person the information targets or identifies?
• What are the risks to the source if the targeted individual is targeted?
Source protection is essential to continued and effective intelligence gathering.
Protecting the source is essential both with respect to that source and additional-present or future-sources.
• What are the risks to the source if the intelligence is made pubhc?
Key to determining the proper forum for trying suspected terrorists.
Target : : M J
• Who is the "target" of the source's information?
What is the person's role in the terrorist organization?
How will detention affect that organization, short-term and long-term alike?
What insight can the source provide regarding "impact"?
• By example: in the suicide bombing infrastructure there are four distinct actors: the bomber, the logistician, the planner, and the financier. Determining the legitimacy of the target (for a targeted kiUing) requires ascertaining the potential target's specific role in the infrastructure. Subject to the two four-part tests above, the four actors are legitimate targets as follows:
a. Planner-legitimate target at all times b. Bomber-legitimate target solely when "operationally engaged"
c. Logistician-legitimate target when involved in all aspects of implementing a suicide bombing but-unhke the planner-not a legitimate target when not involved in a specific, future attack d. Financier-a largely unexplored subject in the context of targeted kilhngs. The financier is a legitimate target when involved in, for example, wiring money or laundering money (both essential for terrorist attacks), but subject to debate and discussion regarding when "not in the act." To that extent, the question is whether the financier is more akin to the bomber or to the logistician. Arguably, given the centrality of the financier's role, the correct placing is between the logistician and planner.
• What are the risks/cost-benefits if the targeted killing is delayed?
How time-relevant is the source's information?
Does it justify immediate action?
Or is the information insufficient to justify a targeted killing but significant enough to justify other measures, including detention (subject to operational considerations)? • What is the nature of the suspicious activity? Does the information suggest involvement in significant acts of terrorism justifying immediate counterterrorism measures? Or is the information more suggestive than concrete? In addition, if the information is indicative of minor/not harmful possible action, effective counterterrorism might suggest additional information gathering-from the same or additional source-before authorization of targeted killing.
• What information can the individual provide (premised on the operational feasibility of detention rather than authorizing a targeted killing)?
• Does the individual possess information-to varying degrees of specificityrelevant to future acts of terrorism/individuals? These charts are subject to two important caveats: independent corroboration that the information provided by the source is reliable and verification that alternatives to mitigating the threat are either unavailable or irrelevant. On the one hand, a civilian taking a direct part in hostilities one single time, or sporadically, who later detaches himself from that activity, is a civilian who, starting from the time he detached himself from that activity, is entitled to protection from attack. He is not to be attacked for the hostihties which he committed in the past. On the other hand, a civilian who has joined a terrorist organization which has become his "home," and in the framework of his role in that organization he commits a chain of hostilities, with short periods of rest between them, loses his immunity from attack "for such time" as he is committing the chain of acts. Indeed, regarding such a civilian, the rest between hostihties is nothing other than preparation for the next hostility."
With respect to the protection of innocent civilians. President Barak wrote:
The approach of customary international law applying to armed conflicts of an international nature is that civilians are protected from attacks by the army. However, that protection does not exist regarding those civilians "for such time as they take a direct part in hostihties" ( §51(3) of The First Protocol). Harming such civilians, even if the result is death, is permitted. on the condition that there is no other less harmful means, and on the condition that innocent civilians nearby are not harmed. Harm to the latter must be proportionate.
That proportionality is determined according to a values based test, intended to balance between the mihtary advantage and the civilian damage. As we have seen, we cannot determine that a preventative strike is always legal, just as we cannot determine that it is always illegal. All depends upon the question whether the standards of customary international law regarding international armed conflict allow that preventative strike or not.'*
CONCLUSION: MOVING FORWARD
In order to simultaneously broaden and narrow the definition of a legitimate target, the six-point proposed checkhst facilitates enhanced operational counterterrorism while seeking to minimize the loss of innocent life. From an operational perspective, the human shielding of otherwise innocent individuals introduces a highly problematic "x factor" in the decision-making process. Under no circumstances are individuals used as human shields legitimate targets. However, if an individual has been correctly identified as a legitimate target and is presently engaged in an act of terrorism, then the two-part test required to define an individual as a legitimate target is met. While the commander is obligated to minimize collateral damage and seek alternatives, the presence of a human shield-in and of itself-does not mitigate the commander's right to engage the identified legitimate target.
Unlike traditional warfare, the state/non-state conflict requires a rearticulation of international law in order to facilitate lawful operational counterterrorism. The legitimate target discussion is, in many ways, at the core of this debate. As demonstrated in the vignette above, the decision making-in identifying the legitimate target-is extraordinarily complex. However, precisely because these are decisions that must be made, implementation of a rationally based approach predicated on checklists and relying on real-life scenarios (such as the vignette) will significantly contribute to more effective, lawful operational counterterrorism.
While targeting criteria were, unequivocally, more clear-cut a century ago, nation-states do not have the luxury of waiting for international law to catch up with the conflict of today. As the discussion above has highlighted, the legitimate target discussion raises profound questions from operational, legal, and moral perspectives. Operation Cast Lead is the operational manifestation of a broadened legitimate target definition; arguably, it represents the future of operational counterterrorism. If that is the case-unlike the extraordinary, resource-heavy, target-specific killing of Bin Laden-then the proposed six-point checkhst suggests a way forward facilitating operational decision making of contemporary commanders engaged in an extraordinarily complex armed conflict with non-state actors beholden to neither international law nor morality.
98. Id. para. 60.
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